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Insurgent conflict has become the most prevalent form of warfare in the modern era. At 
the onset of conflict, an insurgent force is usually at a great disadvantage in comparison 
to the counterinsurgent force. Despite this, modern insurgents often win. What dynamics 
play into the strategy of the insurgents? How can an insurgent force best use its limited 
resources to increase its chances of success? This study shows that there are four best 
practices and two worst practices for insurgents. Beyond the dynamics of specific factors, 
this study also demonstrates that there are common “causal recipes” that help to explain 
the outcome of post World War II insurgencies. The analysis process for this thesis uses 
both a quantitative and qualitative method, using 21 variables to study 70 insurgency 
cases. Ultimately, this research demonstrates that insurgents must devote few material 
resources to attacking COIN forces and many material resources to influencing a 
population’s perception. These findings are important to anyone who must understand 
what actions drive an insurgency toward eventual success or failure. The findings can 
explain past conflicts and can be applied to ongoing or future conflicts to better 
understand the dynamics at play. 
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Insurgent conflict has become the most prevalent form of warfare in the modern 
era. At the onset of conflict, insurgent forces are usually at a great disadvantage in 
comparison to the counterinsurgent (COIN) force. Their lack of material advantage 
precludes them from directly confronting the COIN force. Their size disadvantage often 
makes potential supporters question the logic of joining the insurgency. Insurgencies 
expend limited resources while they struggle to grow and to prove their legitimacy and 
their potential. Despite this, insurgents often win.1 What dynamics play into the strategy 
of the insurgents? How can an insurgent force best use its limited resources to increase its 
chances of success? 
This thesis shows that there are four best practices for insurgent forces. Most 
notable is the concept that insurgents must provide better governance than the 
government in the area of conflict. In addition, this thesis shows that two concepts can be 
characterized as worst practices for insurgents. The data suggests that if the insurgents 
engage in more coercion/intimidation than the COIN force, then their chances of success 
decreases drastically. Beyond the dynamics of specific factors, a qualitative approach 
demonstrates that common “causal recipes” exist, which in part, explain the outcome of 
the cases of modern insurgencies. To reinforce the findings further, this thesis explores 
the interaction between the insurgent and COIN force best practices. A set-theoretic 
approach that uses 70 cases of insurgency and 21 variable indicators will show this 
correlation.2 The statistical analysis process for this thesis consists of two overarching 
procedures: quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. Ultimately, this research 
demonstrates that insurgents must devote few resources to attacking government forces 
                                                 
1 Of the 70 cases studied in this thesis, 41 cases resulted in a political win for the insurgents. In 
addition to this statistic, historical analysis shows that the insurgent success rate has been rising over the 
past century.  
2 Set-theoretic methods are approaches to analyzing social reality through the idea of sets and their 
relations to specific outcomes. See, Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods 
for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). 
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and more resources to manipulating the perception of the population, which in turn will 
allow the insurgency to grow. These findings are important to anyone who must 
understand what actions drive an insurgency toward eventual success or failure. The key 
findings can explain past conflicts, and they can also be applied to ongoing or future 
conflicts to better understand the dynamics at play. 
B. PURPOSE 
Our aim is not to provide new principles and methods of conducting war; 
rather we are concerned with examining the essential content of what has 
long existed, and trace it back to its basic elements.3 
Carl Von Clausewitz 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the actions of modern insurgents and to 
determine how their actions affect the outcome of the conflict. By conducting a historical 
analysis of the cases of insurgency from World War II to 2010, this thesis correlates 
common actions that may lead to either insurgency success or insurgency failure. What 
actions have had an impact on the outcome of the conflict? What actions are most 
influential in insurgent outcomes? Are there similarities among insurgencies that can be 
applied to future cases of conflict, or is each insurgency truly unique? In essence, this 
thesis seeks to identify key features from past cases of insurgency by using both a 
quantitative and a qualitative approach. Although the findings may be valuable to 
policymakers, strategists, and academics, the primary intended audience is Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) planners who must understand what actions drive an insurgency 
toward eventual success. Ultimately, the findings provide these planners with a better 
understanding of the operating environment surrounding an unconventional warfare 
(UW) campaign. 
Most insurgency-centered research projects focus on the root causes of insurgent 
conflict. These studies seek to explain two issues. The first issue is why insurgent conflict 
erupts in a particular area and why it is absent in others; and second, why do some 
                                                 
3 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 389. 
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insurgencies succeed while others fail?4 Both of these approaches seek to draw insight 
from past conflicts to predict the course of future conflict by focusing on observed 
preexisting conditions. This study does not attempt to predict where or when political 
violence or insurgent conflict will happen, other researchers have covered this topic. It 
does not study what causes an insurgency. Rather, this study looks closely at modern 
cases of insurgency to determine causal factors for how insurgents succeed through their 
actions. For a UW planner, it is more important to study how an ongoing conflict will 
evolve over time based on the actions taken by the insurgent group.  
Recommendations of this thesis will come in the form of planning considerations 
for SOF planners. These considerations are not intended to be a set of stand-alone tools; 
rather they should be used in conjunction with other UW planning resources. This will 
ensure a better understanding of any UW operational environment. The applicability may 
vary under differing circumstances and geography, which would require planners to re-
examine the data to determine how well the considerations fit with the changing political 
geography. This thesis will help make future analysis more complete. 
C. SCOPE OF WORK  
Between the end of World War II and 1999, there were roughly five times as 
many wars within states as wars among states. In addition to the observed frequency of 
intra-state wars, these wars were just as bloody, if not more, than inter-state wars.5 Even 
though not all intra-state wars are characterized as insurgent conflicts, insurgent conflict 
                                                 
4 For more information on these two issues, see, David E. Thaler, Ryan Andrew Brown, Gabriella C. 
Gonzalez, Blake W. Mobley, and Parisa Roshan, Improving the US Military’s Understanding of Unstable 
Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013); 
United States Army Special Operations Command, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 
Insurgencies (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013); Central 
Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 
2012); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90; Paul Collier and Dominic Rohner, “Democracy, 
Development, and Conflict,” Journal of the European Economic Association 6, no. 2–3 (2008): 531–540; 
Joseph K. Young, “Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War: States, Dissidents and the Production 
of Violent Conflict,” Political Research Quarterly 1, no. 17 (August 2012): 1–17; Ted R. Gurr, Why Men 
Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
5 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75.  
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has become the most prevalent form of warfare in the modern era.6 Modern insurgencies 
that have occurred since 1945 frame the research pool for this thesis. The scope of this 
thesis will be limited to 71 insurgency cases analyzed in the RAND study entitled, Paths 
to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies.7 This study includes a coded dataset of 
insurgent actions for each of the 71 cases. Each case meets two requirements that qualify 
it to be considered an insurgency case for this project. First, the case is an example of a 
modern insurgency fought between World War II and 2010. Second, the case is resolved 
with a winner, which is either the insurgent force or the counterinsurgent (COIN) force.8 
Chapter II goes deeper into the specifics of these cases.  
Every action an insurgent force can take fits into one of two categories: actions 
directed at the state or COIN force or actions directed at the population, international 
community, or the insurgent organization itself. Insurgent actions focused toward the 
former elements seek to destabilize, degrade, or delegitimize their opponent; actions 
focused toward the latter elements seek to grow, strengthen, or legitimize the insurgency. 
The next chapter will include a more in-depth discussion of insurgent actions. 
1. Research Question 
At the onset of conflict, an insurgent force is often at a disadvantage in 
comparison to the COIN force. Their lack of material advantage precludes them from 
directly confronting the COIN force. Their size disadvantage often makes potential 
supporters question the logic of joining the insurgency. Insurgencies expend limited 
resources while they struggle to grow and prove their legitimacy and their potential. 
Gordon McCormick describes this as the insurgents’ mobilization dilemma: 
Nascent insurgencies often face an opening mobili[z]ation dilemma that 
can cripple their ability to grow into a mature threat to the state. The 
source of this dilemma lies in the fact that the great majority of people 
who are prepared to support an insurgency in principle are only willing to 
                                                 
6 Thomas X. Hammes, “Why Study Small Wars?,” Small Wars Journal 1 (April 2005): 2.  
7 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan, Paths to Victory: Detailed 
Insurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013). 
8 This thesis uses only resolved cases because causal relationships and causal recipes cannot be 
determined for unresolved cases. One of the 71 cases falls into the unresolved category. 
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do so conditionally, depending not only on the costs and benefits of their 
alternatives but the probabilities they assign to each side’s success.9  
These dynamics highlight the underlying questions of this thesis. How can an 
insurgent force best use its limited resources to increase its chance of success? Is it more 
effective to display strength by attacking government forces or is it more effective to 
portray strength by manipulating the perception of the population? Either way, the 
insurgent force must act in order to grow. Each course of action has its advantages and 
disadvantages. U.S. Special Forces (SF) doctrine states, “[i]f the irregular force begins 
noticeable operations too early, opposition forces may concentrate efforts on the irregular 
force and diminish their chances of mission success.”10 Likewise, a resistance force 
operating stagnantly will not demonstrate its commitment to resolving the population’s 
grievances. The insurgency will fail to gain support from the populace. This too is 
acknowledged in SF doctrine. FM 3–05.130 states, “...successful missions lead to 
increases in recruitment, leaders should initially select confidence targets—those with a 
high probability of success and low risk to the irregular force.”11 
a. What Does the Literature Say about Insurgencies? 
From a military standpoint, this thesis does not aim to discover ways to prevent 
conflict; it is more concerned with managing conflicts that arise. Nonetheless, conflict 
prevention is a valuable field of research. The literature on insurgencies is extensive and 
extremely diverse. An extensive amount of research exists on the political environment in 
which insurgent conflicts take place. These studies take a holistic look at the risk factors 
                                                 
9 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
Guerrilla Mobilisation,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 295.  
10 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Army Special Operations 
Forces Unconventional Warfare (Field Manual 3–05.130) (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of 
the Army, 2008), 4–9. 
11 United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Army Special Operations 
Forces, 4–9. 
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for political violence.12 This project takes a different approach by focusing on the 
dynamics of the insurgency itself. This section will focus on literature that attempts to 
tackle the questions surrounding how insurgencies operate, evolve, and end. The 
literature review is divided into five categories to explore five separate insurgent 
dynamics; these are insurgent safe havens, the population, insurgent strategy, conflict 
duration, and external participants. These are recurring themes throughout the literature 
on insurgencies and they will be recurring themes throughout this thesis. 
(1) On Insurgent Safe Havens. If insurgents have an established and secure 
safe haven from which to operate, their chances of success may increase greatly. John 
McCuen states in his book entitled The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, establishing 
base areas and strategic bases is a vital principal of revolutionary strategy.13 In this book, 
McCuen talks about how the area of conflict is divided into three categories. These are, 
the area controlled by the revolutionary force, the area controlled by the government, and 
the contested space in between. He states that the objective for the insurgents is to expand 
their controlled area and, in turn, shrink the area controlled by the government; this is an 
insurgent strategy for success.14 
Mao also argues the importance of safe havens for insurgents. In one of his 
writings, he states:  
...it is impossible to sustain guerrilla war in the enemy’s rear without base 
areas... What, then are the base areas for a guerrilla war? They are the 
strategic bases on which a guerrilla war relies for carrying out its strategic 
                                                 
12 For more information on the risk factors for insurgent violence, see: David E. Thaler, Ryan Andrew 
Brown, Gabriella C. Gonzalez, Blake W. Mobley, and Parisa Roshan, Improving the US Military’s 
Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2013); United States Army Special Operations Command, Human Factors 
Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations 
Command, 2013); Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, DC: 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2012); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 
Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90; Paul Collier and 
Dominic Rohner, “Democracy, Development, and Conflict,” Journal of the European Economic 
Association 6, no. 2–3 (2008): 531–540; Joseph K. Young, “Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil 
War: States, Dissidents and the Production of Violent Conflict,” Political Research Quarterly 1, no. 17 
(August 2012): 1–17; Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
13 John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War; The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency 
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966), 54.  
14 McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, 53.  
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tasks as well as for achieving the goals of preserving and expanding 
oneself and annihilating or expelling the enemy... There have been in 
history many peasant wars of the roving insurgent type, but they all failed. 
In the present age of advanced communications and technology, it is more 
than ever an entirely groundless illusion to attempt to win victory after the 
fashion of the roving insurgents.15  
More recent literature focuses on how ungoverned spaces can provide insurgents 
with a secure place from which to operate. These areas may be within the area of conflict 
or within neighboring areas.16 Either way, the results may be the same. Insurgents with 
an area where they are free to train, plan, and reorganize may have a better chance of 
success over the insurgents that do not. These are by no means the only literary works 
covering the use of safe havens by insurgent groups. Almost every book, article, or 
research project on the topic of insurgent conflict will contain a section that highlights the 
importance of safe havens. The works included in this thesis simply state this dynamic in 
the most powerful way.  
(2) On the Population.  A pivotal study Rebellion and Authority; an Analytic 
Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, by Leites and Wolf, describes an insurgency as an 
operating system.17 This model suggests all insurgencies receive inputs from the 
environment, and this, in turn, is converted into outputs or actions. This process is 
cyclical and constantly changing. Inputs include everything that the insurgency needs to 
survive, grow, and operate. Inputs mainly come from the population. Outputs include 
actions directed at both the population and the government/COIN force. In turn, these 
actions feed back into the environment and shape what inputs the insurgency receives in 
the next cycle.18 This study also talks about the damage both sides inflict on the 
population. The authors state that individuals within the population change sides 
                                                 
15 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan,” in Selected Military Writings 
of Mao Zedong (Peking [Beijing]: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 135.  
16 See, Robert D. Lamb, Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, 2008);  Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, 
Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent 
Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).  
17 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority; an Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970). 
18 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 174. 
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depending on the costs associated with their decision. They make their decisions out of 
fear.19 This would suggest that insurgents should recruit from the population with 
intimidation, if necessary. While these are only a few concepts covered in this study, it is 
important to this thesis because it supports the premise that insurgent actions shape how a 
conflict evolves. Additionally, based on feedback, an insurgency can adapt its actions to 
maximize its likelihood of success. 
In his book entitled Rules for Radicals: a Primer for Realistic Radicals, Saul 
David Alinsky argues that the primary task for any insurgent or outside organizer is to 
overcome suspicion and establish legitimacy among the local populace. He goes on to 
argue that next, “the organizer must then agitate the local population by stirring 
resentments and hostilities in order to overcome apathy and encourage participation.”20 
Alinsky suggests that this is one way for insurgents to overcome the free rider problem. 
Mark Irving Lichbach discusses this free rider problem more; he calls it the rebel’s 
dilemma.21 This dilemma suggests that rebellion should never occur. If everyone expects 
to benefit from the outcome of the conflict, then there is little reason to pay the costs 
associated with joining the insurgents. In Lichbach’s book, he discusses solutions to the 
problem and provides evidence that “the processes used in overcoming the problem of 
collective action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming 
problems of collective action in any given situation, not just conflict.”22  
(3) On Insurgent Strategy.  Ivan Arreguín-Toft explains how the weak win 
wars. Arreguín-Toft suggests that both actors can fight in either a direct or an indirect 
fashion. When both actors take the same approach, the strong actor wins. On the other 
hand, when the two actors pursue different approaches, the weak actor wins.23 Figure 1 
illustrates these findings. While this study provides a useful explanation of why 
                                                 
19 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 127.  
20 As quoted by, United States Army Special Operations Command, Irregular Warfare Annotated 
Bibliography (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2011), 7. 
21 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 
15. 
22 United States Army Special Operations Command, Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography, 19. 
23 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128.  
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insurgencies adopt the indirect approach, it does not address specific actions they must 
take within this approach. Should insurgents take an indirect approach by attacking the 
government or should they indirectly weaken the government by providing support and 
services to the population? 
 
Figure 1.  Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes 
(Expected Winners in Cells).24 
Insurgents must determine which strategy to use depending of their specific 
circumstances. The interactions between the insurgency, the state, and the population are 
important aspects of any conflict. Insurgents can focus either on positively engaging the 
population or fighting rival elements. Some researchers study historical cases to explain 
how different strategies affect the outcome of a conflict, and some researchers have 
developed models to simulate the different strategies. One historical study from which 
this thesis takes its data looks at actions that the COIN force controls. Paths to Victory 
identifies 24 COIN concepts that were tested against 59 core cases of insurgency. The 
findings in the report indicate that 17 of the 24 concepts had strong support to suggest 
that they are effective against an insurgent force. Three of these concepts are considered a 
priority (tangible support, commitment and motivation, and flexibility and adaptability)  
 
                                                 
24 Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” 108.  
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because they were present in every case where the COIN force won. One concept (“crush 
them”) had strong evidence against its effectiveness.25 Are there also insurgent concepts 
that increase their effectiveness?  
Shifting now to research that focuses on modeling different strategies; two 
writings by Scott D. Bennett simulate the interactions between the actors in a conflict. 
“Governments, Civilians, and the Evolution of Insurgency: Modeling the Early Dynamics 
of Insurgencies” and “Recruiting Your Way to Victory: Varying Strategies in 
Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Warfare” both model the dynamics of an insurgency using 
computer simulations.26 The first simulation suggests that it is more important for the 
COIN force to avoid collateral damage than it is to capture members of the insurgency 
during an operation.27 This suggests a population focused strategy. The first study 
focuses heavily on the COIN force so Bennett went on to complete a second study, which 
focuses on the insurgency. Bennett’s second study adds the option for insurgents to 
recruit supporters rather than undertaking military attacks, which reflects the idea that an 
insurgent force should also focus its actions on the population and not on the government. 
In addition, Bennett’s study found that recruitment is more beneficial for both sides rather 
than undertaking military action.28 
(4) On Conflict Duration. In “Things Come Together,” Gordon McCormick 
and Frank Giordano explore how an insurgency survives in its beginning stages. The 
study identifies that every insurgency has an opening mobilization dilemma and that the 
insurgency must grow in order to pass its “insurrection point.”29 This is the point at 
which the insurgency is expanding because of the bandwagon effect. They suggest that to 
reach the insurrection point, an insurgency must:  
                                                 
25 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan, Paths to Victory: Lessons from 
Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), xix–xxii. 
26 Scott D. Bennett, “Governments, Civilians, and the Evolution of Insurgency: Modeling the Early 
Dynamics of Insurgencies,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 11, no. 4 (October 2008): 
1–7; Scott D. Bennett, “Recruiting Your Way to Victory: Varying Strategies in Insurgent/ Counterinsurgent 
Warfare,” August 2010, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.2139/ssrn.1661172. 
27 Bennett, “Governments, Civilians, and the Evolution of Insurgency,” 6.  
28 Bennett, “Recruiting Your Way to Victory,” 14.  
29 McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together,” 305.  
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depend on its ability to create a false reality through the perceptual effect 
of its armed actions. To the degree that it is able to do so, it will have 
created the opportunity to turn its generated images into facts and resolve 
its opening mobili[z]ation dilemma. While the insurgency must still be 
able to effectively exploit this opportunity to win, it will have overcome a 
primary barrier to its success.30 
(5) On External Participants.  External participants may play a major role in 
insurgent conflict. This dynamic may aid the insurgents in several different ways. With 
few resources, insurgents may gain strength and capability by receiving money, 
equipment, and training from outside actors. External military elements may even engage 
in active conflict alongside or even on behalf of the insurgents. This type of support may 
provide the insurgent force with an incredible advantage over what they would have had 
otherwise. In The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, McCuen describes outside support 
as a vital principal of revolutionary war. In this book, he states, “Outside support is often 
decisive in a revolutionary war.”31 He goes on to say, without support from an external 
participant, it is unlikely that either side will prevail or the conflict will result in a 
stalemate. McCuen quotes both Mao and Vo Nguyen Giap to provide support for his 
claim that outside support is a fundamental insurgency dynamic. Mao wrote, 
“International support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle today in any country or 
of any nation.”32 Giap said during a lecture in 1950: 
...We will have to receive aid from abroad in order to be able to carry out 
the counter-offensive, but to count solely upon it without taking into 
account our own capabilities is to show proof of subjectivism and lack of 
political conscience. But on the other hand we cannot deny the importance 
of such aid.33 
Some researchers argue that the nature of external support for insurgents has 
shifted in recent years. They state that outside state support is much less necessary now 
than it was before the end of the Cold War. Five researchers from RAND produced a  
 
                                                 
30 McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together,” 318. 
31 McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, 69.  
32 Mao Zedong, On the Protracted War (Peking [Beijing]: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), 239.  
33 Giap as quoted in McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, 65.  
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report titled, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. In this study, the 
authors concluded that other types of outside support play an increasing role in insurgent 
conflict. 
Indeed, state support is no longer the only, or necessarily the most 
important, game in town. Diasporas have played a particularly important 
role in sustaining several strong insurgencies. More rarely, refugees, 
guerrilla groups, or other types of non-state supporters play a significant 
role in creating or sustaining an insurgency, offering fighters, training, or 
other important forms of support.34 
b. What Gaps are in the Literature? 
It is evident from the literature covered in the previous section that more research 
must be conducted to determine how insurgencies influence the course of a conflict by 
using different tactics. The literature above may answer questions about why insurgencies 
start, why insurgencies end, how insurgencies operate, and even how a COIN force wins. 
However, the literature does not adequately address specific insurgent actions and their 
results. This is the principal gap that this thesis seeks to fill. 
Historical case studies of a few specific conflicts only provide a portion of the 
picture. They do suggest how the insurgent prevailed in that specific case, but fail to 
show if the findings are universal. This thesis fills another gap by providing insight into a 
wide range of cases across different regions, timeframes, and cultures. 
Some literature suggests that the preexisting conditions may decide the outcome 
of intra-state conflict.35 Therefore, the outcome can be may be determined before fighting 
has even begun. This thesis, however, assumes that the outcome of a conflict is not 
necessarily predetermined. While preexisting conditions or risk factors play a role in 
starting insurgent conflict, the actions of the insurgent force and the COIN force 
determine the outcome.36 Studying the political and social environment surrounding a 
                                                 
34 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, xiii. 
35 For example, see, Frank H. Zimmerman, “Why Insurgents Fail: Examining Post-World War II 
Failed Insurgencies Utilizing the Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies as a Framework” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).  
36 Chapter III includes a supplementary analysis on insurgent/COIN force interactions. The 
methodology section, to follow, discusses this analysis in more detail.  
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conflict is only half of the process in understanding how insurgents win. While it is 
important to understand that factors like poor governance, disenfranchised minorities, 
poverty, and ungoverned space help decision makers recognize where and why conflict 
exists, it will not help decision makers shape the outcome of ongoing conflicts. There is 
no doubt that the insurgent’s narrative and motivations are initially vital for mobilizing 
support and gaining legitimacy. Over the long-term however, other factors play into the 
dynamics of every insurgent conflict. 
2. Hypotheses 
This thesis separates the theories discussed in the previous literature review into 
five independent hypotheses. Each hypothesis focuses on a specific insurgent dynamic 
that may affect the outcome on a conflict. The five most influential insurgent dynamics 
are safe havens, the population, insurgent strategy, conflict duration, and external 
participants. The primary focus of this project is to determine the soundness of the five 
hypotheses. This thesis also seeks to understand the insurgent best practices. It is possible 
that a combination of variables or a few specific variables are always necessary to show a 
correlation between insurgent actions and the outcome of the conflict. The five 
hypotheses include: 
 Hypothesis 1: Insurgents require a safe haven from which to operate.  
 Hypothesis 2: The insurgent force cannot be perceived as worse than the 
COIN force in the area of conflict.  
 Hypothesis 3: It is better for insurgents to provide or ensure basic services 
for the population than to focus on discrediting or delegitimizing the 
COIN force/government.  
 Hypothesis 4: Longer conflict duration does not necessarily correlate with 
an insurgent win.  
 Hypothesis 5: External support is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
One main counterargument exists that opposes the hypotheses offered above. One 
could argue that insurgent actions have little influence on the outcome of an insurgency. 
This argument may suggest that the actions of the government or COIN force are what 
determine the outcome of a conflict. In most cases, the government has more forces, 
more equipment, more security, and more support. Simply because they are in control of 
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the state, the government has some level of legitimacy. The government may also control 
a majority of the resources upon which the population depends. Lastly, the government 
has a media advantage and can access the population more openly and more frequently 
than the insurgents. This suggests that the government may be able to gain supporters 
from the population more easily if their messages are effective or if they address the 
reasons for the insurgency. 
One rebuttal to this argument is that the insurgents have the information 
advantage. The insurgents know where the COIN force is located, and they can pick the 
time and place in which to act. They also hold the initiative. If the insurgents fear defeat, 
they can choose not to act. The government does not have the benefit of knowing where 
the insurgents are located. Therefore, the government’s advantages of resources, media, 
security, and support, do not aid their efforts in countering the insurgents. Even though 
this is a two-sided game, the actions of the insurgents may determine the pace and 
direction of the conflict.  
3. Methodology 
This thesis uses both a quantitative and qualitative approach to determine if there 
is a causal relationship between the actions of modern insurgents and the outcome of the 
conflicts in 70 modern cases using set-theoretic analysis methods. The main question to 
be addressed is which actions play a role in determining insurgent success? This study is 
explicitly different from the RAND study, discussed earlier, because it focuses solely on 
actions that the insurgents influence, rather than actions of a COIN force. Data 
correlation, using 21 independent variables, will determine the best and worst insurgent 
practices and reveal a set of causal recipes, which will define how an insurgency can best 
use its limited resources. After these factors are identified, this thesis will conduct a brief 
supplementary analysis, using the same methods, to compare the interactions between the 
insurgent and COIN force best practices.37 These interactions are critical in developing a 
full understanding of the dynamics within any conflict; however, this thesis only attempts 
                                                 
37 COIN force best practices are pulled from, Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern 
Insurgencies, xxvi. 
 15 
to analyze them within the scope of this study. The primary focus remains on the 
insurgent dynamics. The interaction dynamics require further research. Data was 
collected from several established and reputable sources. Predominantly, this thesis uses 
the dataset accompanying Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies.38  
a. Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variable for this thesis is the outcome of the conflict as 
identified in the Paths to Victory study. The aforementioned project categorizes the cases 
of insurgency in terms of either a COIN win or a COIN loss. This thesis uses the same 
assessment but reverses the determination to identify each case as either an insurgent win 
or loss. Many of the cases produced complicated outcomes. That is, when the conflict 
ended the winner was still unclear. In order to include these cases in the research, the 
Paths to Victory study used the flowchart illustrated in Figure 2 to determine if these 
cases could be considered a COIN win or loss.39 This thesis also adopts this approach to 
determine the conflict outcome from the insurgent standpoint.40  
                                                 
38 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies.  
39 “First, for each case, we asked whether the government targeted by the insurgency 
stayed in power through the end of the conflict and whether it retained sovereignty over 
the region of conflict. If insurgents either deposed (or otherwise led to the fall of) the 
government or won de facto control of a separatist region, then the COIN force did not 
win. If the government remained in power and the country intact, then we further 
considered whether the government had been forced to (or chose to) make major 
concessions to the insurgents, such as through power sharing or loss of territory or other 
sovereign control, or was otherwise forced to yield to insurgent demands. If the 
government stayed in power, the country remained intact, and no major concessions were 
granted to the insurgents, then the COIN force unambiguously won. If, however, major 
concessions were made, then the outcome was mixed. In all cases, what constituted a 
‘major’ concession and who (the COIN force or the insurgents) had the better of a mixed 
outcome was determined at the discretion of the individual case analyst and was based on 
the distinct narrative of that case.” Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern 
Insurgencies, 16–20. 
40 See Chapter II for the determined outcome in each of the 70 cases.  
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Figure 2.  Logic for Assignment of Case Outcomes41 
b. Independent Variable Groupings 
All the independent variables used in this thesis are combined into five categories, 
which this study calls independent variable groupings. These groupings are labeled H1–
H5 and each relates back to one of the five hypotheses. For example, grouping H1 relates 
to hypothesis 1, and so on. All of the variable groupings contain several specific actions 
(indicators) that are coded in the dataset to be used during the correlation process. 
Chapter II covers the complete list of factors and their subset indicators. The framework 
for these variables was partially derived from a list of insurgent actions found in the 
Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency.42 The five independent variable groupings are:  
 H1, insurgents established a reliable and secure safe haven.  
 H2, insurgents effectively shaped the perception of the population. 
 H3, insurgents effectively displaced government structure and functions. 
 H4, insurgents effectively managed the duration of the conflict. 
 H5, insurgents enlisted help from an external participant. 
                                                 
41 From, Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 17.  
42 Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, DC: Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2012), 27. 
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c. Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis process for this thesis consists of two overarching 
procedures; these are quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. Each type of analysis 
requires two steps and each step is used to refine the results and test their robustness. 
First, the quantitative approach focuses on frequency analysis and proportion comparison. 
This procedure is used to narrow the number of variables and eliminate any factors that 
show weak results. Second, the qualitative approach uses the remaining strong variables 
to determine which factors show a direct correlation with the desired outcome, which is 
an insurgency win in this study. This is achieved by using a set-theoretic method called 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Two types of QCA are used, the crisp set 
method and the fuzzy set method.43 The crisp set method uses binary indicators, whereas, 
the fuzzy set method uses percentage indicators. By using both of these methods, this 
thesis will be able to determine the durability of the key findings. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into four interrelated chapters. The following chapter 
covers the approach to data analysis. First, it identifies and defines the cases of 
insurgency, the actions of the insurgencies in each case, and what constitutes a case to be 
categorized as either an insurgent win or loss. The second chapter also outlines both the 
quantitative and qualitative data analysis processes. The third chapter discusses the key 
findings of the research project by illustrating the data correlation results and comparing 
the results with the hypotheses offered in Chapter I. The third chapter also offers the 
broader findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis processes, to include the 
validity of the 21 factors and the insurgent best and worst practices. The fourth and final 
chapter discusses the larger significance to the insurgency field of research. It suggests 
recommendations for evaluating ongoing insurgencies, UW planning considerations, and 
areas of further research. Finally, the thesis includes five appendices. Appendix A 
                                                 
43 See, Nicolas Legewie, “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA),” Forum: Qualitative Social Research 14, no. 3 (September 2013) and Rick Davies, 
“Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” BetterEvaluation, last modified January 13, 2014, 
http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/qualitative_comparative_analysis. 
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contains the frequency quad-charts for all five independent variable groupings. Appendix 
B contains the cross-tabulation charts used to determine the strength of each factor. 
Appendix C includes the qualitative analysis results, including the full list of causal 
recipes. Appendix D shows the results of a sensitivity analysis, which determines the 
robustness of the key findings. Appendix E includes a quick reference guide, which 
contains the hypotheses, independent variable groupings, and the 21 insurgent factors.  
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II. APPROACH TO DATA ANALYSIS 
A. THE CASES AND THEIR OUTCOMES 
This thesis starts by looking at all 71 cases of modern insurgencies, which are 
identified in the Paths to Victory study. Only modern insurgencies are studied because 
the scope of this thesis is limited by the available cases in the Paths to Victory dataset. No 
insurgency that occurred before World War II is used in this thesis. This study identifies 
that one case does not meet the second requirement stated in the first chapter. La 
Violencia in Colombia (1948–1958) was excluded because its outcome was mixed and a 
holistic winner could not be determined. This limits the study to 70 remaining modern 
cases of insurgency.  
This thesis adopts the outcome assessment found in the Paths to Victory data to 
determine the results of the 70 cases. These binary outcomes act as the dependant 
variables for the analysis process. The RAND data codes each case as either a holistic 
COIN win or loss. This thesis uses the same assessment but reverses the determination to 
identify each case as either an insurgent win or loss. For the COIN force, this thesis 
defines a win as winning without conceding "major" concessions to the insurgents.44 If 
the COIN force did not achieve this, the case is coded as an insurgent win. Likewise, if 
the data identifies that the COIN force won in a stable and lasting way, the case is coded 
as an insurgent loss. Table 1 includes the complete list of cases and their outcome. 
According to this assessment, 41 of the 70 cases resulted in an insurgent win.   
Table 1.   70 Modern Cases and Their Outcome 
Case Date Span Outcome 
UK in Palestine 1944–1947 Insurgent Win 
Greek Civil War 1945–1949 Insurgent Loss 
Indochina 1946–1955 Insurgent Win 
Philippines Huk Rebellion 1946–1956 Insurgent Loss 
Malaya 1948–1955 Insurgent Loss 
                                                 
44 Major concessions may include power-sharing, loss of authority, or yielding to insurgent demands. 
Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 17.  
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Case Date Span Outcome 
Kenya 1952–1956 Insurgent Loss 
Algerian Independence 1954–1962 Insurgent Win 
Cyprus 1955–1959 Insurgent Win 
Cuba 1956–1959 Insurgent Win 
Tibet 1956–1974 Insurgent Loss 
Oman 1957–1959 Insurgent Loss 
Indonesia/Darul Islam 1958–1962 Insurgent Loss 
Laos 1959–1975 Insurgent Win 
Guatemala 1960–1996 Insurgent Loss 
Namibia 1960–1989 Insurgent Win 
South Africa 1960–1990 Insurgent Win 
South Vietnam 1960–1975 Insurgent Win 
Angolan Independence 1961–1974 Insurgent Win 
Eritrea 1961–1991 Insurgent Win 
Kurdistan 1961–1975 Insurgent Loss 
Guinea-Bissau 1962–1974 Insurgent Win 
Mozambique Independence 1962–1974 Insurgent Win 
Yemen 1962–1970 Insurgent Win 
Uruguay 1963–1972 Insurgent Loss 
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia 1965–1980 Insurgent Win 
Oman Dhofar Rebellion 1965–1975 Insurgent Loss 
Cambodia 1967–1975 Insurgent Win 
Argentina 1969–1979 Insurgent Loss 
Northern Ireland 1969–1999 Insurgent Loss 
Jordan 1970–1971 Insurgent Loss 
Bangladesh 1971 Insurgent Win 
Philippines (MNLF) 1971–1996 Insurgent Loss 
Baluchistan 1973–1978 Insurgent Loss 
Angola (UNITA) 1975–2002 Insurgent Loss 
Lebanese Civil War 1975–1990 Insurgent Win 
Indonesia/East Timor 1975–2000 Insurgent Win 
Western Sahara 1975–1991 Insurgent Loss 
Indonesia Aceh 1976–2005 Insurgent Loss 
Mozambique (RENAMO) 1976–1995 Insurgent Loss 
Sri Lanka 1976–2009 Insurgent Loss 
Nicaragua (Somoza) 1978–1979 Insurgent Win 
Afghanistan (anti-Soviet) 1979–1992 Insurgent Win 
Kampuchea 1979–1992 Insurgent Win 
El Salvador 1979–1992 Insurgent Loss 
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Case Date Span Outcome 
Peru 1980–1992 Insurgent Loss 
Somalia 1980–1988 Insurgent Win 
Nicaragua (Contras) 1981–1990 Insurgent Win 
Senegal 1982–2002 Insurgent Loss 
Sudan 1984–2004 Insurgent Win 
Turkey (PKK) 1984–1999 Insurgent Loss 
Uganda (ADF) 1986–2000 Insurgent Loss 
Papua New Guinea 1988–1998 Insurgent Win 
Liberia 1989–1997 Insurgent Win 
Moldova 1990–1992 Insurgent Win 
Rwanda 1990–1994 Insurgent Win 
Sierra Leone 1991–2002 Insurgent Loss 
Afghanistan (post-Soviet) 1992–1996 Insurgent Win 
Algeria (GIA) 1992–2004 Insurgent Loss 
Croatia 1992–1995 Insurgent Loss 
Georgia/Abkhazia 1992–1994 Insurgent Win 
Nagorno-Karabakh 1992–1994 Insurgent Win 
Bosnia 1992–1995 Insurgent Win 
Tajikistan 1992–1997 Insurgent Win 
Burundi 1993–2003 Insurgent Win 
Chechnya I 1994–1996 Insurgent Win 
Afghanistan (Taliban) 1996–2001 Insurgent Win 
Kosovo 1996–1999 Insurgent Win 
Nepal 1996–2006 Insurgent Win 
Zaire (anti-Mobutu) 1996–1997 Insurgent Win 
Congo (anti-Kabila) 1998–2003 Insurgent Win 
 
B. ACTIONS OF THE INSURGENTS  
Early in the study, it was determined that the list of insurgent factors would need 
to be narrowed to a number that could be realistically analyzed within the scope of this 
thesis. The method for reducing the number of independent factors is a three-step 
process. First, all of the factors included in the RAND study were reviewed and all 
factors pertaining to the COIN force, government, political situation, or social system 
were rejected. This thesis only retains factors that are related to the dynamics of the 
insurgents. This step reveals roughly 100 factors, which is still too many to analyze using 
 22 
the methods in this thesis. Step two merges similar factors and eliminates any factor that 
does not relate, to some extent, to one of the five hypotheses. This step reveals 21 
insurgent concepts. These factors act as the independent variables for both the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis methods. Each factor was assigned to a specific 
hypothesis, which forms the independent variable groupings. This is a critical step in the 
analysis process because each factor acts as an indicator for a specific hypothesis. Step 
three is conducted during the quantitative analysis process. This process analyzes the 21 
independent variables and only the factors that demonstrate strong support for or against 
their respective concept are used in the final qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
process. Table 2 includes the 21 insurgent actions, their factor number, and the 
independent variable grouping of each. For brevity reasons, this thesis sometimes uses an 
abbreviated form of the word “factor.” The factor numbers, listed in Table 2, are used in 
place of the entire word; for example, “f1” is used to replace “factor 1.” 





H1 f1 Parts of the area of conflict were no-go or otherwise denied to 
the COIN force 
H1 f2 Military action outside of host-nation borders (if insurgents 
relied on cross-border support or havens) 
H1 f3 Terrain played a major role because it provided sanctuary for the 
insurgents (COIN forces could not/would not enter terrain) 
H2 f4 Insurgents collateral damage not perceived by population in area 
of conflict as worse than COIN force 
H2 f5 Insurgents exploited deep-seated/intractable issues to gain 
legitimacy 
H2 f6 Insurgents demonstrated potency through impressive or 
spectacular attacks 
H2 f7 
Insurgents engaged in more coercion/intimidation than COIN 
force 
H2 f8 
Insurgents employed unconstrained violence (against civilians) 







H2 f9 Insurgents delegitimized due to civilian casualties or other 
unacceptable behavior 
H2 f10 Insurgents forcibly recruited from civilian population 
H3 f11 Insurgents provided better governance than government in area 
of conflict 
H3 f12 Insurgents provided or ensured provision of basic services in 
areas they controlled or claimed to control 
H3 f13 Insurgents discredited/delegitimized COIN force/government 
H4 f14 
Insurgents mostly avoided engaging in large-scale operations 
against better-equipped regular troops and resorted primarily to 
guerrilla tactics (e.g., sniping, sabotage, small-scale 
ambushes/hit-and-run attacks, IEDs) 
H4 f15 Conflict caused significant host-nation economic disruption 
H4 f16 Fighting primarily force-on-force conventional engagement 
H4 f17 Insurgents switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics 
H4 f18 Insurgents switched from conventional to guerrilla tactics 
H5 f19 Insurgents received external support from strong state/military 
H5 f20 External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of 
insurgents 
H5 f21 External support continued to sustain conflict that otherwise 
would likely have ended 
 
C. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Step One: Frequency 
To illustrate the frequency of each factor, this thesis uses a basic quad-chart for 
each of the five independent variable groupings. Each independent variable grouping 
corresponds with a hypothesis and contains anywhere from three to seven indicators or 
factors. For example, independent variable group H1 corresponds with hypothesis 1 and 
includes f1–f3. The X-axis of the each frequency quad-chart divides cases of insurgency 
win from cases of insurgency loss; the Y-axis divides cases where the factor was present 
from cases where the factor was absent. The number in each quadrant represents the 
number of cases that meet those respective criteria. See Figure 3. The upper left quadrant 
contains the number of cases where the factor was absent and the insurgents won; the 
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lower left quadrant contains the number of cases where the factor was absent and the 
insurgents lost. Conversely, the upper right quadrant contains the number of cases where 
the factor was present and the insurgents won; the lower right quadrant contains the 
number of cases where the factor was present and the insurgents lost. Factors in the upper 
right and lower left quadrants support the hypothesis; whereas, factors in the upper left 
and lower right quadrants undermine the hypothesis. Appendix A contains the frequency 
quad-charts for each hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Example Independent Variable Group Frequency Quad-Chart.  
2. Step Two: Cross-Tabulations 
The second step in the quantitative process is to look at frequencies at a deeper 
level and examine the proportion of cases in each quadrant. This will give insight into 
which factors have an effect on the outcome. To visualize this process, this thesis uses 
cross-tabulation charts. These charts are initially produced using the QCA program, but 
are later reproduced in Excel so that they can be easily included in this project. Appendix 
B contains the full set of cross-tabulation charts. There is a single chart for each factor 
sorted by independent variable grouping. The following cross-tabulation example 
illustrates the occurrence percentages for the frequency data in each case. See Table 3. 
Columns separate the number of cases where the factor was present from the number of 
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cases where the factor was absent. Rows separate the cases of insurgency win from cases 
of insurgency loss. The four sets of numbers inside of the enclosed boxes represent the 
number of cases, their row percentage, their column percentage, and their total 
percentage respectively. The numbers at bottom of each chart show the column totals and 
the numbers at the far right show the row totals. 
Table 3.   Example Cross-Tabulation Chart 
 
D. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The qualitative approach used in this thesis is based on crisp and fuzzy set 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA was also the method of analysis used in 
the Paths to Victory study and the approach seems to be the most appropriate for this 
thesis as well.45 QCA is a type of research method within the broader set-theoretic 
method used in the social sciences. Set-theoretic research methods share three features: 
“first, they work with membership scores of cases in sets; second, they perceive 
relationships between social phenomena as set relations; third, these set relations are 
interpreted in terms of sufficiency and necessity, as well as forms of causes that can be 
derived from them...”46 More specifically, QCA is a case-based historical analysis tool 
                                                 
45 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 193–196. 
46 Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences, 3.  
Factor (f#)
Outcome NO (0) YES (1)
N N
Row % Row %
Column % Column %
Total % Total %
N N
Row % Row %
Column % Column %
Total % Total %
WIN (1) # WIN
LOSS (0) # LOSS
# NO # YES
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designed to “assess configurations of case similarities and differences using simple 
logical rules.”47 In this project, the process for analyzing crisp and fuzzy sets is the same 
and the only difference is the data used at the start. For this reason, this thesis will explain 
the QCA process first and then define and explain how the crisp and fuzzy datasets are 
derived from the RAND Paths to Victory data. 
To ensure that the qualitative analysis process produces accurate and relevant 
results, this thesis follows a QCA format presented by Carsten Schneider and Claudius 
Wagemann in their guide to QCA.48 This “recipe for a good QCA” recommends 10 steps. 
 The appropriateness of the set-theoretic methods 
 The choice of the conditions and the outcome 
 The choice of the QCA variant 
 Calibration of set-membership scores 
 Analysis of necessary conditions 
 Analysis of sufficient conditions 
 Presentation of results 
 Interpretation of results 
 Reiteration of the research cycle 
 The use of software  
Beyond the process itself, six terms need to be understood. These terms show up 
in the final QCA results and they are used to gauge the appropriateness of the causal 
conditions. A causal recipe is a formula of factors that are combined to explain the 
outcome. Consistency indicates to what degree the data is in line with the assumed causal 
conditions. Raw coverage indicates the extent to which a specific combination of factors 
can explain the outcome. Unique coverage indicates the number of cases that can be 
explained exclusively by that combination of factors. Solution consistency indicates the 
combined reliability of all the causal recipes. Solution coverage indicates the combined 
coverage of all the causal recipes.49 
                                                 
47 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 193. 
48 Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences, 275–284.  
49 Legewie, “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis,” 20. 
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1. Crisp Data 
Crisp data is strictly binary. A crisp set allows only full membership and full non-
membership for each factor. Either the factor is present or it is absent. The RAND Paths 
to Victory data fits this description. This thesis uses the data from that study with one 
fundamental modification that allows this project to use both QCA processes. The RAND 
data separates each case into phases. This project combines these phases so that each case 
has a single data point for each factor. If the factor is observed in 50 percent or more of 
the phases, the factor is coded as full membership. If the factor is observed in less than 50 
percent of the phases, it is coded as full non-membership. The resulting crisp data is then 
analyzed using the steps described above. 
2. Fuzzy Data 
A fuzzy dataset is a set,  
...which allows for partial membership, in addition to full membership and 
full non-memberships. Translated into the social sciences, it enables the 
researcher to work with concepts for which the establishing of differences 
in degree among qualitatively similar cases is both conceptually plausible 
and empirically feasible.50 
Factors in this dataset are coded with the percentage of time they are observed. 
The only difference between the fuzzy set data and the crisp set data is the numbers 
assigned to each factor during the case phase combination process. Simply put, the fuzzy 
set values equal the number of phases in which the factor was present divided by the total 
number of phases in that case. For example, a case with four phases had a factor that was 
present in three of the four phases; the fuzzy set value for that factor would equal .75. It 
indicates 75 percent membership. In the crisp set, that same factor would equal one 
because it was present 50 percent of the time or more. Fuzzy set QCA will produce 
results that are more precise. By using both of these QCA methods, this study will be 
capable of determining the robustness of the findings and ultimately, how well the 
findings apply to other cases. 
                                                 
50 Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences, 326. 
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III. FINDINGS 
A. KEY FINDINGS 
1. Evaluating the Hypotheses 
This section will review the five hypotheses and the independent variable group, 
which includes several indicators, used to test each premise. This section will go on to 
discuss the soundness of each hypothesis based on the findings presented within this 
chapter. Ultimately, the purpose of this section is to apply the results of the data analysis 
process and to demonstrate how they either support or oppose the concepts outlined in the 
first chapter. 
a. Hypothesis 1: Insurgents Require a Safe Haven from Which to Operate  
The independent variable used to test this hypothesis was if the insurgents 
established a reliable and secure safe haven. This variable contains three indicators. The 
analysis shows that only one indicator or factor has a considerable effect on the outcome 
of the conflict. This indicator is f1 (parts of the area of conflict were no-go or otherwise 
denied to the COIN force), therefore, it is the only factor within this variable grouping 
that is used in the QCA process. Over 80 percent of the cases studied show that the 
insurgents used some type of safe haven. The data shows that a terrain based safe haven 
actually produces a negative effect for the insurgents. Frequency analysis shows that the 
insurgent’s success rate when they have a safe haven is only slightly higher than when 
they did not have a safe haven (85 rather than 83 percent). The act of establishing a safe 
haven does not show up in any of the significant causal recipes, see Tables 6 and 7. These 
findings suggest that this first hypothesis is unsound. Insurgents do not require a safe 
haven and in fact, some types of safe havens hurt the insurgent’s ability to succeed. 
While it may be true that some specific insurgencies did benefit greatly from a reliable 
and secure safe haven, this assessment demonstrates that the concept is not universal. 
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b. Hypothesis 2: The Insurgent Force Cannot be Perceived as Worse Than 
the COIN Force in the Area of Conflict 
The independent variable used to test this hypothesis was if the insurgents 
effectively shaped the perception of the population. This variable contains seven 
indicators. The analysis shows that three factors have a considerable effect on the 
outcome of the conflict, two of which are positive and one is negative. Avoiding 
excessive collateral damage and demonstrating effectiveness through impressive attacks 
are dynamics that aid in insurgency success. On the other hand, the use of intimidation or 
coercion negatively influences the population and undermines the insurgent’s goals. All 
four significant QCA causal recipes contain at least one of these three factors. Factor 7 
(engaged in more coercion or intimidation) is by far the most influential. When it was 
absent, the insurgents won in 69 percent of the cases studied. These findings suggest that 
this hypothesis is sound. The perception of the population matters a great deal and the 
insurgents must strive to appear more legitimate than the COIN force. At this level of 
analysis, it seems that actions focused on the population generate the strongest effects for 
an insurgency.  
c. Hypothesis 3: It is Better for Insurgents to Provide or Ensure Basic 
Services for the Population Than to Focus on Discrediting or 
Delegitimizing the COIN Force/government 
The independent variable used to test this hypothesis was if the insurgents 
effectively displaced government structures and functions. This variable contains three 
factors. The findings show that two factors have strong support and one factor has weak 
support. Factor 12 (providing basic services) has minimal impact on the outcome 
according to all the types of analysis used in this thesis. The proportion of wins and 
losses are roughly the same in cases where the factor is present and absent. This finding 
suggests that it is not important for the insurgents to provide basic services to the 
population. The findings for f11 (provide better governance) and f13 (delegitimized 
government) suggest that it is very important for the insurgents to discredit the 
government/COIN force. Factor 11 is the most significant concept throughout all aspects 
of the data analysis process. It has substantial support from the quantitative approach and 
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even more support from the qualitative approach. This is an important factor in all four of 
the QCA causal recipes. Factor 13 is not nearly as significant as the previous factor; 
however, it is present in one of the fuzzy QCA recipes. This implies that it may be more 
effective for insurgents to discredit the government indirectly by providing better 
governance to the population than it is to delegitimize them directly. These findings 
suggest that the wording of this hypothesis is unsound. In fact, the findings show the 
opposite; it is better for insurgents to discredit or delegitimize the COIN 
force/government than provide or ensure basic services for the population.  
d. Hypothesis 4: Longer Conflict Duration Does Not Necessarily Correlate 
with an Insurgent Win 
As the first chapter discussed, conflict duration may be an important dynamic in 
insurgent conflict. The independent variable used to test this hypothesis was if the 
insurgents effectively managed the duration of the conflict. This variable contains five 
factors. Two of these factors demonstrated strong support during the quantitative analysis 
process but neither proved important in the QCA process. The four significant causal 
recipes contain none of the factors within this variable group. Therefore, these two 
methods could not determine the soundness of this hypothesis.  
To understand how the length of the conflict affects the outcome, this thesis looks 
at the conflict duration data found in the dataset. Figure 4 shows the outcome of all 70 
cases in relation to their duration in months. The Y-axis represents the conflict duration 
in months and the X-axis represents the individual cases. The square markers indicate the 
losing insurgency cases and the triangle markers indicate the winning insurgency cases. 
This graph illustrates that the duration of both the winning and losing cases range from 
short to very long. The average length of the 41 winning cases is 112 months; the average 
length of the 29 losing cases is 152 months. Six of the longest 10 conflicts resulted in an 
insurgency loss. Likewise, eight of the 10 shortest conflicts resulted in an insurgency win. 
These findings suggest that this hypothesis is sound. It is false to assume that longer 
conflict durations favor the insurgents. The data demonstrates that duration in and of 
itself favors neither side. 
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Figure 4.  Duration of the 70 Cases 
e. Hypothesis 5: External Support is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient 
The independent variable used to test this hypothesis was if the insurgents enlisted 
help from an external participant. This variable contains three factors. Two of these three 
indicators are used in the QCA process because they showed strong support in the 
quantitative analysis process. Factor 20 (external military engaged in fighting on behalf 
of the insurgents) is a negated factor in one of the significant fuzzy set recipes.51 In other 
words, the recipe required that the insurgents not allow an external military to engage in 
the fighting on their behalf. One factor within the recipe relates to the perception of the 
population, so an external actor may hurt the insurgent’s legitimacy in these cases. Factor 
19 (support from strong state/military) is a factor in the second crisp and fuzzy set recipe 
along with demonstrating potency through attacks. These attacks may not have been 
possible without outside support. Frequency analysis shows the insurgents won 15  
 
 
                                                 
51 A significant causal recipe is a recipe with a raw coverage score greater than .25. To see the full list 
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percent of the time with no outside support and lost 59 percent of the time with support. 
This would suggest that this hypothesis is sound. For an insurgency, external support is 
not necessary and by no means is it sufficient. 
2. Answering the Questions 
Next, one must look back at the research questions posed in the first chapter to see 
if any answers are now available. How can an insurgent force best utilize its limited 
resources to increase its chance of success? Is it more effective to display strength by 
attacking rival elements or is it more effective to portray strength by manipulating the 
perception of the population? The answers to these questions are now somewhat 
apparent. With little resources, insurgents should focus on the best practices and avoid 
the worst. A majority of their efforts should focus on legitimacy and proving this 
legitimacy to the population. This research found that the specific tactics or ways of 
operating have much less impact on the outcome than the time and effort spent on 
shaping the perception of the population. Therefore, they must devote few resources to 
attacking rival elements and many resources to manipulating the perception of the 
population, which in turn will allow the insurgency to grow. Focusing on the population 
is necessary for insurgent success but this strategy is not necessarily sufficient in and of 
itself. At some point in the conflict, the insurgents may need to increase their focus on 
demonstrating military capabilities to grasp victory before the government can respond to 
the insurgent expansion. 
B. BROADER QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
1. Frequency Analysis 
The first step in testing the validity of the 21 independent factors is to look at the 
frequency in which each indicator occurs across all 70 cases. Analyzing frequency is the 
quantitative step to identify which factors strongly support the hypotheses. Chapter II 
describes how the quad-charts are organized and used. Appendix A contains the 
frequency quad-charts for each hypothesis. This chapter only highlights three important 
takeaways from this initial step in the analysis process. First, grouping H1 shows that 
insurgents relied on safe havens within the area of conflict three times more often than 
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they relied on cross-border movements for safe havens. Additionally, the insurgents had 
some type of save haven in 80 percent of the cases studied. While it is apparent that a 
vast majority of insurgencies utilize a safe haven, at this point in the study it is unclear 
how this affects the outcome of the conflict. Second, grouping H4 contains three factors 
that are the most unevenly distributed between the frequency chart quadrants. Factor 17 
(insurgents switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics) was present in only seven of 
the cases. Factor 16 (fighting was primarily force-on-force conventional engagement) and 
factor 18 (insurgents switched from conventional to guerrilla tactics) were present in only 
eight of the cases. In other words, these factors were present in only 10 percent of the 
cases studied. This is interesting because the finding goes against the theory that 
insurgents must switch between guerrilla and conventional style tactics depending on 
their capability and the evolution of the conflict. These factors deserve more analysis in 
the following sections. Third, grouping H5 shows that the insurgents had some sort of 
external support in more than 70 percent of the cases. Much like the first finding, support 
from an external actor cannot be linked directly to insurgent success at this point. 
Ultimately, the validity of the factors and the degree to which they support the 
hypotheses is still undetermined and this requires a second step in the quantitative 
process. 
2. Proportion Analysis 
The next step in the quantitative analysis process is to examine the cross-
tabulation chart for each of the factors. Chapter II describes how the cross-tabulations are 
organized and used. Appendix B contains a cross-tabulation chart for each factor. Cross-
tabulation analysis is a good method for studying general tendencies across all cases. It 
will help reduce the number of factors used in the subsequent qualitative steps to only 
those with a high degree of support.52 Table 4 is an example of a simplified chart that 
shows the relationship between the four possible scenarios (cells 1–4) and the validity of 
the factor’s concept (causal condition). Analysis of the cross-tabulation charts suggests 
that 10 concepts have strong support and are therefore valid. All of the following factors 
                                                 
52 Charles C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 21.  
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showed strong support for their respective concept except for f7 (engaged in more 
coercion or intimidation), which showed strong support against the concept. Below is a 
description of each valid concept and the indicators that demonstrate the assessment. 
Table 4.   Conventional Cross-tabulation of Presence/absence of an 
Outcome Against Presence/absence of a Causal Condition53 
 
a. Factor 1  
Parts of the area of conflict were no-go or otherwise denied to the COIN force. 
The chart for this factor shows that when the factor was present, 62 percent of the time 
the insurgents won. When it was absent, the insurgents won only 50 percent of the time. 
Forty-one of the 70 cases support the concept. Out of the three factors in independent 
variable grouping H1, this is the only factor that seems to have a visible effect on the 
outcome.  
b. Factor 4 
Insurgents collateral damage was not perceived by population in area of conflict 
as worse than COIN force. The chart for this factor shows that when the factor was 
present, more than 60 percent of the time the insurgents won. Likewise, the factor was 
present in 63 percent of the 41 winning insurgency cases. When the factor was absent, the 
number of wins and the number of losses were almost equal.  
c. Factor 6 
                                                 





Causal Condition Absent Causal Condition Present
Cell 1: Cases here undermine 
researcher's argument
Cell 2: Cases here support 
researcher's argument
Cell 3: Cases here support 
researcher's argument
Cell 4: Cases here undermine 
researcher's argument
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The insurgents demonstrated potency through impressive or spectacular attacks. 
This factor is one of only six factors that suggest the insurgents are more likely to win if 
the factor is present and more likely to lose if it is absent. For instance, the cross-
tabulation chart for this factor shows that when the factor was present, the insurgent’s 
success rate was 64 percent. When it was absent, their success rate dropped to 27 percent. 
This factor was present in almost 93 percent of the 41 winning insurgency cases. 
d. Factor 7 
Insurgents engaged in more coercion/intimidation than COIN force. The chart for 
this factor shows that when the factor was present, 51 percent of the time the insurgents 
won. When it was absent, the insurgents won 69 percent of the time. This is the only 
factor that showed strong support against the concept. The insurgents engaged in this 
action in 51 percent of the winning cases and in 69 percent of the loosing cases. Factor 8, 
insurgents employed unconstrained violence against civilians, is very similar in nature to 
f7 but it shows results that provide no support for or against the concept. The cross-
tabulation percentages for f8 are almost equal in cases where the factor was present and 
absent. This suggests that the population may view intimidation or coercion as worse than 
insurgent violence. 
e. Factor 11 
Insurgents provided better governance than the government in the area of conflict. 
This factor produced the strongest results in support of the concept. When the factor was 
present, 77 percent of the time the insurgents won. When it was absent, the insurgents 
won only 30 percent of the time. The insurgents provided better governance in 80 percent 
of the winning cases and did not provide better governance in 65 percent of the losing 
cases. Fifty-two of the 70 cases (74 percent) support this concept.  
f. Factor 13 
Insurgents discredited and/or delegitimized the COIN force/government. This 
factor was present in 61 of the 70 cases. Out of these 61 cases, 39 or 64 percent resulted 
in an insurgency win. There are only two cases, 5 percent, where the factor was absent 
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and the insurgents won. These findings show that the insurgents are more likely to win if 
the factor is present and more likely to lose if it is absent. 
g. Factor 15 
The conflict caused significant host-nation economic disruption. The cross-
tabulation chart shows that when the factor was present, the insurgent’s success rate was 
better than 69 percent. When it was absent, their success rate dropped to 33 percent. This 
factor was present in 82 percent of the 41 winning insurgency cases. Again, the 
insurgents are more likely to win if the factor is present and more likely to lose if it is 
absent. 
h. Factor 17 
Insurgents switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics. When the factor was 
present, the insurgents won 71 percent of the time. However, this only equals seven 
cases. The factor was absent in 90 percent of the cases. In the 29 cases of insurgency loss, 
the factor was absent 93 percent of the time. In the 41 cases of insurgency win, the factor 
was absent 88 percent of the time. As stated earlier, this finding opposes the theory that 
insurgents must switch between guerrilla and conventional style tactics depending on 
their capability and the evolution of the conflict. 
i. Factor 19 
Insurgents received external support from a strong state/military. This factor also 
shows that the insurgents are more likely to win if the factor is present and more likely to 
lose if it is absent. The chart shows that when the factor was present, the insurgent’s 
success rate was better than 72 percent. When it was absent, their success rate dropped to 
37 percent. This factor was present in 76 percent of the 41 winning insurgency cases. 
j. Factor 20 
An external professional military engaged in the fighting on behalf of insurgents. 
When an external professional military fought for the insurgents, their success rate was 
80 percent. Without an external professional military fighting for the insurgents, the 
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success rate was 53 percent. While the insurgents can achieve success on their own, these 
results suggest that an external actor greatly helps their chances for success.  
3. Validity Matrix for All Factors 
Table 5 shows the results of the quantitative analysis by assigning a degree of 
support to each factor. Consistent with the Paths to Victory study, factors were tested for 
support in both kind (for or against) and degree (strong or weak).54 Just as in the previous 
sections, each factor is listed in order according to its factor number and sorted by 
independent variable grouping. A short explanation of the factor’s concept is provided in 
the center column followed by the factor’s degree of support. The findings produced five 
levels of support. Strong support for and strong support against a factor indicates that it 
had a considerable effect on the outcome of the conflict. Weak support for and weak 
support against a factor indicates that it had a slight effect on the outcome. No support for 
or against a factor indicates that the factor had neither a positive nor a negative effect on 
the outcome of the conflict.  
Only about half of the 21 factors studied display strong support for the concept 
that they represents. In fact, nine factors display strong support for and two factors 
display weak support for the concept. On the other hand, only one factor displays strong 
support against and four display weak support against the concept. Five factors have no 
support for or against their respective concepts according to the data and the methods 
covered in the previous sections. One finding that these results suggest is actions that 
produce positive results for the insurgents are much more powerful than actions that 
produce negative results. In other words, if an action is productive for the insurgents, it 
will most likely have either a strong effect or no effect at all on the conflict outcome; 
there is very little in-between on this side of the spectrum. On the other end of the 
spectrum, actions that are counterproductive for the insurgents have only weak effects on 
the outcome and it is hard for an action to fall into the “strong support against” category. 
This suggests that insurgents have more “room for error” in executing negative actions 
than the government or COIN force. 
                                                 
54 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 136–138.  
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Num. Concept Degree of Support 
H1 f1 No-go areas for COIN force Strong Support For 
H1 f2 Cross-border safe haven Weak Support For 
H1 f3 Terrain safe haven Weak Support Against 
H2 f4 Collateral damage not perceived as worse Strong Support For 
H2 f5 Exploited deep-seated issues Weak Support Against 
H2 f6 Demonstrated potency through attacks Strong Support For 
H2 f7 Engaged in more coercion or intimidation Strong Support Against 
H2 f8 Employed unconstrained violence No Support For or Against 
H2 f9 Delegitimized due to civilian casualties No Support For or Against 
H2 f10 Forcibly recruited from population Weak Support Against 
H3 f11 Provided better governance Strong Support For 
H3 f12 Provided basic services  Weak Support For 
H3 f13 Discredited government or COIN force Strong Support For 
H4 f14 Avoided large scale operations Weak Support Against 
H4 f15 Caused significant economic disruption Strong Support For 
H4 f16 Primarily force-on-force engagement No Support For or Against 
H4 f17 Switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics Strong Support For 
H4 f18 Switched from conventional to guerrilla tactics No Support For or Against 
H5 f19 Support from strong state/military Strong Support For 
H5 f20 External military engaged in fighting Strong Support For 
H5 f21 External support sustained the conflict No Support For or Against 
 
Beyond the degree of support for each factor, quantitative analysis brought to 
light three factors that demonstrated results that were counterintuitive to what is 
commonly accepted as good insurgency characteristics. First, there is weak support 
against the concept that a terrain-based sanctuary (f3) would produce positive results for 
the insurgents. When this factor was present, the insurgents won in 55 percent of the 
cases; when it was absent, they won in 63 percent of the cases. Likewise, in all the cases 
of insurgency win, the insurgents used a terrain provided sanctuary 51 percent of the 
time. In all the cases of insurgency loss, the insurgents used a terrain provided sanctuary 
59 percent of the time. While these numbers do not provide strong support against a 
sanctuary using terrain, they are counterintuitive because this thesis assumes that any safe 
haven would benefit the insurgents. One possible explanation for this finding is that 
terrain not only separates the insurgents from the government/COIN force, it also 
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separates them from the population. This limits their ability to gain resources like people, 
guns, or money. Second, there is weak support against the concept that insurgents should 
avoid engaging in large-scale operations (f14). When the insurgents did avoid large-scale 
operations, they won 55 percent of the time, but when they did not avoid large-scale 
operations, they won 69 percent of the time. Likewise, in all the cases of insurgency win, 
the insurgents avoided large-scale operations 73 percent of the time. In all the cases of 
insurgency loss, the insurgents avoided large-scale operations 83 percent of the time. 
Again, this finding is counterintuitive to conventional wisdom but it is not enough to 
justify insurgents using large-scale operations if they do not have the resources to do so 
successfully. A deeper look at the cases where insurgents used large-scale operations 
with a successful outcome may show that these insurgencies were well established and 
strong enough to conduct these types of operations. Third, there was strong support for 
switching from guerrilla to conventional tactics (f17). As mentioned earlier, the 
insurgents won in 71 percent of the cases that this factor was present. The insurgents also 
won in 36 cases where the factor was absent. This shows that an insurgency can win 
without switching to conventional tactics, but if they do switch it is likely that the action 
will result in success. One explanation for this finding is that the insurgents may have 
switched to conventional tactics at the right time and grasped victory before the COIN 
force could react. Again, the dynamics of these specific cases require deeper analysis. 
C. BROADER QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
The previous section revealed 10 concepts that showed strong support. The next 
step in the analysis process is to determine which combinations of factors have the most 
significant impact on the dependent variable, which is the outcome of the conflict. This 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) will reveal a set of causal recipes. In the end, the 
insurgent best and worst practices can be deduced from the commonality of factors 
within these recipes. This thesis suggests that there is no definitive recipe for success in 
an insurgency. No one factor and no specific combination of factors can explain success 
in every case but some factors seem to have more of an effect than others do on the 
outcome. This is unlike the findings in the RAND study, Paths to Victory. The authors 
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found four COIN factors that were present in every case that resulted in a COIN win.55 
This thesis did not find such a universal combination of factors. This does not mean that 
they do not exist for an insurgency; it only means that there may be additional factors that 
need to be researched and included in the data. Appendix C contains the complete set of 
QCA results to include truth tables and set solutions. 
To illustrate the QCA results much clearer than those depicted in Appendix C, 
this thesis uses a framework that Nicholas Legewie presented in a 2013 article entitled, 
“An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” In 
this article, he describes how to create an enhanced table of QCA results.56 He suggests,  
such a table combines the results from the formalized QCA with 
additional information. It provides a comprehensive, concise 
representation of the outcome that can serve as a point of quick reference 
when re-analyzing cases in the light of QCA results.57  
This section includes an enhanced table of QCA results for both the crisp and 
fuzzy datasets. Each table shows the recipe and solution parameters and includes the 
consistency scores, coverage scores, and the simplifying assumptions.  
1. Crisp Set Results 
Table 6 highlights two of the most significant recipes from the crisp set analysis. 
First, when the insurgents provided better governance than government in area of conflict 
(f11), demonstrated potency through impressive or spectacular attacks (f6), and did not 
engage in more coercion/intimidation than COIN force (f7) the insurgents won 93 percent 
of the time. This is crisp set recipe 1. Recipe 1 covers 14 of the 41 winning insurgency 
cases. Recipe 2 covers 23 of the 41 winning cases but it has a much lower consistency 
score. This recipe is 88 percent consistent across all cases where these factors were 
present. However, exclusively, these two recipes can explain only 19 cases. In other 
                                                 
55 “In the 59 core cases, every winning case implemented these four concepts, [commitment and 
motivation, tangible support reduction, flexibility and adaptability, and at least two of the following: unity 
of effort, initiative, and intelligence] and no losing case had all four of them...” Paul et al., Paths to Victory: 
Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, 149–150. 
56 Legewie, “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis,” 21. 
57 Legewie, “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis,” 22. 
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words, other combinations of factors exist that can also explain how the insurgents won. 
Recipes 1 and 2 are the focus of this section because they show the greatest amount of 
coverage. Crisp set analysis suggests that the recipes cover 90 percent of the winning 
insurgency cases and combined they are 90 percent consistent. The next section will test 
if these findings withstand analysis that is more precise. 
Table 6.   Enhanced Table of Crisp QCA Results 
 
2. Fuzzy Set Results 
Looking at how these results hold up using the fuzzy set method of QCA, this 
research found some similarities and some differences. As discussed in Chapter II, the 
fuzzy data was derived from the same data as the crisp set. Fuzzy set QCA gives the 
analysis a greater level of certainty. Table 7 shows the significant results of the fuzzy set 
QCA process. Just as with the crisp set results, this approach also reveals two causal 
recipes with a significant proportion of raw coverage, that is, “the extent to which each 
recipe can explain the outcome.”58 First, recipe 1 explains the outcome in 13 of the 41 
                                                 
58 Legewie, “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis,” 19. 
Recipe Parameters Recipe 1: f6 + ~f7 + f11 Recipe 2: f6 + f11 + f19
Consistency 0.93 0.88
Raw Coverage (# of cases) 0.34 (14) 0.56 (23)
Unique Coverage (# of cases) 0.12 (5) 0.34 (14)
Solution Parameters All Recipes
Consistency 0.90
Coverage (# of cases) 0.90 (37)
Unique Coverage (# of cases) 0.46 (19)
Overlap (# of cases) 0.44 (18)
Simplifying Assumptions Condition f1 (present) No-go areas for COIN force
Condition f4 (present) Collateral damage not perceived as worse
Condition f6 (present) Demonstrated potency through attacks
Condition f7 (absent) Engaged in more coercion or intimidation
Condition f11 (present) Provided better governance
Condition f13 (present) Discredited government or COIN force
Condition f15 (present) Caused significant economic disruption
Condition f17 (present) Switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics
Condition f19 (present) Support from strong state/military
Condition f20 (present) External military engaged in fighting
 43 
winning insurgency cases. Moreover, when f7 (engaged in more coercion or intimidation) 
was absent, f11 (provided better governance), and f13 (discredited/delegitimized COIN 
force/government) were present there was an 89 percent consistency within all the 
winning insurgency cases. This recipe is similar to the most significant recipe in the crisp 
analysis, but factor 13 replaces factor 6. Second, recipe 2 explains the outcome in 20 of 
the 41 winning insurgency cases. Combined, the two most noteworthy fuzzy set solutions 
can account for the desired outcome in 87 percent of the cases studied. Recipe 2 exactly 
matches the second recipe from the crisp analysis. In both cases, this recipe has a lower 
consistency score than recipe 1. This suggests that recipe 2 is a reliable factor 
combination but when f7 is absent and f11 is combined with another best practice, the 
insurgents have a greater likelihood of success. This section improves on the findings in 
the previous section and suggests that no factor or combinations of factors are necessary 
for success but two combinations are very close to being sufficient. 
Table 7.   Enhanced Table of Fuzzy QCA Results 
 
Recipe Parameters Recipe 1: ~f7 + f11 + 13 Recipe 2: f6 + f11 + f19
Consistency 0.89 0.85
Raw Coverage (# of cases) 0.31 (13) 0.48 (20)
Unique Coverage (# of cases) 0.03 (1) 0.12 (5)
Solution Parameters All Recipes
Consistency 0.87
Coverage (# of cases) 0.79 (33)
Unique Coverage (# of cases) 0.15 (6)
Overlap (# of cases) 0.64 (27)
Simplifying Assumptions Condition f1 (present) No-go areas for COIN force
Condition f4 (present) Collateral damage not perceived as worse
Condition f6 (present) Demonstrated potency through attacks
Condition f7 (absent) Engaged in more coercion or intimidation
Condition f11 (present) Provided better governance
Condition f13 (present) Discredited government or COIN force
Condition f15 (present) Caused significant economic disruption
Condition f17 (present) Switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics
Condition f19 (present) Support from strong state/military
Condition f20 (present) External military engaged in fighting
 44 
3. Insurgent Best and Worst Practices 
Factors that produce the best results for the insurgents based on the qualitative 
analysis are: 
 f6, Insurgents demonstrated potency through impressive or spectacular 
attacks (H2).  
 f11, Insurgents provided better governance than government in area of 
conflict (H3).  
 f13, Insurgents discredited/delegitimized COIN force/government (H3).  
 f19, Insurgents received external support from strong state/military (H5).  
Factors that produce the worst results for the insurgents based off the qualitative 
analysis are: 
 f7, Insurgents engaged in more coercion/intimidation than COIN force 
(H2).  
 f20, External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of 
insurgents (H5).  
Of the four best practices, f11 (provided better governance) is by far the most 
powerful concept. It is the only factor present in all four of the significant causal recipes. 
This concept also produced considerable support in the both quantitative steps. This 
suggests that insurgents should focus their actions on gaining the capability and resources 
to provided better governance than government in area of conflict. Of the two worst 
practices, f7 (engaged in more coercion or intimidation) has the strongest support for 
avoiding this concept. It is present in both of the causal recipes that produced the greatest 
consistency. Insurgents should avoid engaging in coercion/intimidation if it is going to 
make them look less legitimate than the COIN force.59  
4. Insurgency and COIN Force Interaction 
Now that the best practices for the insurgents are identified, it is quite simple to 
use QCA to see how these factors interact with five similar COIN best practices 
                                                 
59 To strengthen the arguments discussed throughout Chapter III, this thesis conducted a sensitivity 
analysis to determine the robustness of the principal findings. This process produced results that reinforce 
all of the key findings. It shows that the most significant factors remain dominant when the data is 
randomly varied by as much as 15 percent. Above that percentage, the set of meaningful attributes becomes 
less dominate and the disparity between all 10 factors begins to decrease. For more information on the 
sensitivity analysis process and the robustness of the findings, see Appendix D. 
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identified in the RAND Paths to Victory study.60 The COIN best practices used in this 
section are found in Table 8, and are identified by the “r” before their RAND factor 
number. This section illustrates the results of this process and identifies three interesting 
takeaways. Section E of Appendix C contains the full results for these interactions. 
Table 8.   Enhanced Table of Crisp Interaction QCA Results 
 
 
The first finding from this supplementary analysis is that one significant causal 
recipe emerges. This recipe is identical to the second recipe produced in both the crisp 
and fuzzy analysis with the only difference being factor r4 (COIN force established a 
secure area). When the COIN force failed to establish and expand their secure area, the 
consistency of the recipe increased from 88 percent in the previous crisp set study to 95 
percent in this study. Therefore, if the COIN force fails to address this issue the 
insurgents will have a greater likelihood for success. The second finding is that factor 11 
(provided better governance) remains an important concept for the insurgents. It is 
present in all significant causal recipes in this thesis. In addition to f11, f6 (demonstrated 
                                                 
60 Paul et al., Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, xxvi. 
Recipe Parameters
Consistency 0.95
Raw Coverage (# of cases) 0.51 (21)
Unique Coverage (# of cases) 0.31 (13)
Solution Parameters All Recipes
Consistency 0.95
Coverage (# of cases) 0.51 (21)
Unique Coverage (# of cases) 0.31 (13)
Overlap (# of cases) N/A
Simplifying Assumptions Condition f6 (present) Demonstrated potency through attacks
Condition f11 (present) Provided better governance
Condition f13 (present) Discredited government or COIN force
Condition f19 (present) Support from strong state/military
Condition r1 (present) Improvements in infrastructure
Condition r3 (present) Perception of security maintained
Condition r4 (present) COIN force est. secure area
Condition r11 (present) COIN force avoided excessive force
Condition r39 (present) COIN force est. positive relations w/ pop. 
Recipe 1: f6 + f11 + f19 + ~r4
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potency through attacks) is present in the most significant interaction recipe. It was not 
present in one of the initial fuzzy set recipes. The final finding is that most of the COIN 
best practices included in this analysis seem to have an effect on the outcome if the 
insurgency follows the best practices. This suggests that the actions of the insurgency 
outweigh the actions of the COIN force. This reinforces a point made in the first chapter; 
the actions of the insurgents may determine the course of a conflict. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The insurgent’s efforts should focus on legitimacy and demonstrating this 
legitimacy to the population. Specific tactics or ways of operating have much less impact 
on the outcome than the time and effort spent on shaping the perception of the 
population. Therefore, the insurgent force must devote fewer resources to attacking rival 
elements and many resources to manipulating the perception of the population, which in 
turn will allow the insurgency to grow. Focusing on the population is necessary for 
insurgent success but this strategy is not necessarily sufficient in and of itself. At some 
point in the conflict, the insurgents may need to increase their focus on demonstrating 
military capabilities to grasp victory before the government can respond to the insurgent 
expansion. 
Above all, this thesis found that if the insurgent force focuses its actions on the 
population to increase legitimacy, it has a higher likelihood of success. In cases where the 
actions reflect a focus on the population, a win for the insurgent force was observed more 
often than not. Conversely, a trend of insurgent losses occurred in cases where the 
insurgents focused their actions on the government or COIN force. In addition to this 
overarching aspect of insurgent conflict, this thesis also argues the reliability of five 
dynamics. One, insurgents do not require a safe haven and in fact, some types of safe 
havens hurt the insurgent’s ability to succeed. Two, the insurgents must strive to appear 
more legitimate than the COIN force. Three, it may be more effective for insurgents to 
discredit the government indirectly by providing better governance to the population than 
it is to delegitimize them directly. Four, it is false to assume that longer conflict durations 
favor the insurgents. Five, external support for the insurgent force is not necessary and by 
no means is it sufficient.  
Four actions can help an insurgent force win. One, the insurgents must provide 
better governance than the government in the area of conflict. Two, the insurgents must 
discredit or delegitimize the COIN force and government. Three, demonstrating potency 
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through impressive or spectacular attacks aids the insurgent’s efforts only if they also 
take actions to shape the perception of the population. Four, the insurgents benefit from 
receiving external support from a strong state or military only if this support is 
accompanied by the ability to provide better governance than the government. 
Conversely, two actions hinder an insurgent force. If they engage in more coercion or 
intimidation than the COIN force or if an external professional military engages in the 
fighting on behalf of the insurgents, the likelihood of insurgent success decreases. Three 
and possibly all four of the best insurgent practices center on the population. Success in 
the 70 cases directly correlates with these actions. In the end, it is obvious that the 
population is the center of gravity for the insurgents. 
While this study did not find a combination of variables or a few specific 
variables, which are always necessary to show a correlation between insurgent actions 
and the outcome of the conflict, it did find that some factors are much more influential 
than other factors. Table 9 is a summary of the results presented throughout this thesis. 
The most influential action that an insurgent force can pursue is to provide better 
governance than the government in the area of conflict. This factor was present in 100 
percent of the noteworthy combinations of actions. The next most influential action is to 
avoid engaging in more coercion or intimidation than the COIN force. This factor was 
present in 50 percent of the noteworthy combinations of actions. Both actions pertain to 
the perception of the population and affect the legitimacy of the insurgency. When these 
two actions are combined, the findings show that just over 30 percent of the winning 
insurgency cases contained these two actions. This suggests that they are not necessary 
for success. More interesting is the fact that this combination may be sufficient for 
success if these factors are implemented in conjunction with any one of the remaining 
insurgent best practice. When the insurgents employed these two actions together, only 
an average of four cases resulted in a loss for the insurgency. This is one potentially 
reliable pathway to success for an insurgency. 
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Table 9.   Thesis Results Summary61 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. UW Planning Considerations  
Look for ways to interact with and engage the population. Focus on the best 
practices and determine which actions can be achieved depending on the unique 
operating environment of the specific conflict. Once a conflict starts, nothing matters 
more than the actions of the actors involved. Specifically, the interactions section of this 
thesis suggests that the actions of the insurgents have more influence on the outcome of 
the conflict than the actions of the COIN force. When planning a future UW operation or 
evaluating one that is underway, a planner must pay special attention to the actions the 
insurgents are pursuing. These actions may very well determine the outcome of the 
conflict; this outcome could be a win or a loss for the insurgency. Do not focus too 
closely on the enemy’s actions; the insurgent force cannot influence this dynamic 
directly.  
Experiment by using different actions to determine which will achieve effects in 
your specific operating environment. An insurgent force cannot be constrained by a 
single strategy and this study suggests that insurgents have more “room for error” in 
                                                 
61 The final column titled “coverage” indicates the percentage of time the factor was present in the 
parsimonious causal recipes whose raw coverage score was greater than .25. To see the full list of causal 
recipes, see Appendix C.  
Concepts and Valid Insurgent Actions Results Coverage
Insurgents require a safe haven (H1) Unsound
No-go areas for COIN force (f1) Strong support 0%
Cannot be perceived as worse than the COIN force (H2) Sound
Collateral damage not perceived as worse than govt. (f4) Strong support 0%
Demonstrated potency through attacks (f6) Strong support: Best insurgent practice 50%
Did not engage in more coercion/intimidation than govt. (~f7) Strong support: Worst insurgent practice 50%
It is better to provide or ensure basic services (H3) Unsound
Provided better governance than govt. (f11) Strong support: Best insurgent practice 100%
Discredited government or COIN force (f13) Strong support: Best insurgent practice 16%
Conflict duration does not correlate with outcome (H4) Sound
Caused significant economic disruption (f15) Strong support 0%
Switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics (f17) Strong support 0%
External support is neither necessary nor sufficient (H5) Sound
Support from strong state/military (f19) Strong support: Best insurgent practice 66%
External military did not engage in fighting for insurgents(~f20) Strong support: Worst insurgent practice 16%
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executing negative actions than the government or COIN force. Only a few actions 
demonstrate strong support against their respective concept and many actions 
demonstrate weak support. This leaves room for some level of trial and error for the 
insurgents. 
Construct an analysis tool to determine the capacity and capability of the 
insurgent force. Determine what resources are needed to execute the desired actions and 
reallocate other resources if they are not in line with the desired intent. If more resources 
are needed, take the time to develop ways to secure these resources and avoid actions that 
cannot be conducted to the preferred standard. This will eliminate any unneeded strain on 
the insurgent’s ability to train, equip, grow, and carry out their best practices. 
2. Areas of Further Research 
One additional area of future research could include other dynamics (risk factors 
or preexisting conditions) to determine how they influence the actions and to determine 
how they affect the outcome. This would add another level of analysis to the 
understanding of insurgent conflict. A project with this topic would bridge the gap 
between the areas of research that were discussed in the first chapter with the area 
researched in this thesis.62 How do the insurgent’s motivations or narratives affect the 
outcome? How do the political dynamics within an area of conflict affect how the 
insurgents operate? Several of these social, economic, and political dynamics are also 
available in the RAND dataset. 
A second topic for further analysis could include a deeper look into the 
interactions between the insurgents and the COIN force or government. This study could 
take a more in-depth look at the best practices outlined in this thesis and in the Paths to 
                                                 
62 An extensive amount of research exists on the political environment in which insurgent conflicts 
take place. These studies take a holistic look at the risk factors for political violence. For more information, 
see, David E. Thaler, Ryan Andrew Brown, Gabriella C. Gonzalez, Blake W. Mobley, and Parisa Roshan, 
Improving the US Military’s Understanding of Unstable Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist 
Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013); United States Army Special Operations 
Command, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Fort Bragg, NC: United 
States Army Special Operations Command, 2013); Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the Analysis of 
Insurgency (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2012); Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
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Victory study to determine the most influential factors for either side. Does either side 
have a naturally occurring advantage over the other? Are there any insurgent actions that 
negate the best practices of the COIN force? Just as in the previous recommendation for 
further research, the data and framework for this topic are available and can be easily 
adapted to meet the research requirements.   
Finally, one could mirror this project and or the Paths to Victory study using 
different quantitative or qualitative research methods to determine if the findings hold up. 
Quantitatively, it would be interesting to see if the significant factors and causal recipes 
remain important using traditional mathematical procedures, which could include multi-
variable regression and mathematical modeling. Qualitatively, additional research could 
be conducted using a traditional case study approach. Using the finding in this thesis as a 
framework, a researcher could apply the concepts to specific cases to determine if they 
are applicable. This would add a level of historical detail to this field of research.  
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APPENDIX A. FREQUENCY QUAD-CHARTS 
This appendix contains the frequency quad-charts for all factors grouped with 
their relevant hypothesis. See Figures 5–9. The X-axis of the each frequency quad-chart 
divides cases of insurgency win from cases of insurgency loss; the Y-axis divides cases 
where the factor was present from cases where the factor was absent. The number in each 
quadrant represents the number of cases that meet those respective criteria. The upper left 
quadrant contains the number of cases where the factor was absent and the insurgents 
won; the lower left quadrant contains the number of cases where the factor was absent 
and the insurgents lost. Conversely, the upper right quadrant contains the number of cases 
where the factor was present and the insurgents won; the lower right quadrant contains 
the number of cases where the factor was present and the insurgents lost. 
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE GROUP H1 
Hypothesis 1: Insurgents require a safe haven from which to operate. 
Independent Variable: Insurgents established a reliable and secure safe haven. 
 
Figure 5.  H1 Frequency Quad-Chart 
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B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE GROUP H2 
Hypothesis 2: The insurgent force cannot be perceived as worse than the COIN 
force in the area of conflict.  
Independent Variable: Insurgents effectively shaped the perception of the 
population. 
 













C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE GROUP H3 
Hypothesis 3: It is better for insurgents to provide or ensure basic services for the 
population than to focus on discrediting or delegitimizing the COIN force/government. 
Independent Variable: Insurgents effectively displaced government structure and 
functions.  
 













D. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE GROUP H4 
Hypothesis 4: Longer conflict duration does not necessarily correlate with an 
insurgent win. 
Independent Variable: Insurgents effectively managed the duration of the conflict.  
 
 















E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE GROUP H5 
Hypothesis 5: External support is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
Independent Variable: Insurgents enlisted help from an external participant.  
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APPENDIX B. CROSS-TABULATIONS 
The following cross-tabulations illustrate the occurrence percentages for the 
frequency data in each case. Columns separate the number of cases where the factor was 
present from cases where the factor was absent. Rows separate the cases of insurgency 
win from cases of insurgency loss. The four sets of numbers inside of the enclosed boxes 
represent the number of cases, their row percentage, their column percentage, and their 
total percentage, respectively. The numbers at bottom of each chart show the column 
totals and the numbers at the far right show the row totals.  
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APPENDIX C. QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
RESULTS 
A. CRISP SET TRUTH TABLE 
Table 10.   Complete Crisp Set Truth Table from fsQCA 
f1 f4 f6 f7 f11 f13 f15 f17 f19 f20 Num Win Raw 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 0.8 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 0 0.7 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.5 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0.5 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 
B. CRISP SET SOLUTIONS 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---  
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000 






f4*f6*~f7*f11*f13*~f15*~f17*~f19*~f20 0.097561    0.097561    1.000000  
f4*f6*~f7*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19*~f20 0.121951    0.121951    1.000000  
f1*~f4*f6*f7*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19 0.170732    0.073171    1.000000  
f1*f6*f7*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19*f20 0.170732    0.073171    0.875000  
Solution coverage: 0.463415 






--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---  
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000 






f6*~f7*f11  0.341463    0.121951    0.933333  
f6*f11*f19  0.560976    0.341463    0.884615  
Solution coverage: 0.682927 
Solution consistency: 0.903226 
 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---  
Frequency cutoff: 2.000000 






f13*f11*~f7*f6*f4 0.292683    0.170732    0.923077  
f19*f15*f13*f11*f6*f1 0.439024    0.317073    0.947368 
Solution coverage: 0.609756 
Solution consistency: 0.925926 
C. FUZZY SET TRUTH TABLE 
Table 11.   Complete Fuzzy Set Truth Table from fsQCA 
f1 f4 f6 f7 f11 f13 f15 f17 f19 f20 Num Win Raw PRI SYM 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.7 0.7 0.7 
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
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f1 f4 f6 f7 f11 f13 f15 f17 f19 f20 Num Win Raw PRI SYM 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
D. FUZZY SET SOLUTIONS 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---  
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  






f1*f4*~f7*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19*~f20 0.151220    0.032683    0.837838  
f4*f6*~f7*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19*~f20 0.145122    0.026585    0.873715  
f1*~f4*f6*f7*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19 0.200000    0.083415    0.873269  
~f1*f4*f6*~f7*f11*f13*~f15*~f17*~f19*~f20 0.048780    0.048780    0.800000  
~f1*f4*~f6*~f7*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19*f20 0.024390    0.024390    1.000000  
f1*f4*f6*~f7*f11*f13*f15*f17*f19*f20 0.026341    0.018293    1.000000  
f1*f6*~f7*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19*~f20 0.128293    0.000000    0.859477  
f1*~f4*f6*f11*f13*f15*~f17*f19*~f20 0.134390    0.000000    0.822388 
Solution coverage: 0.447805 
Solution consistency: 0.886100 
 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---  
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  






~f1*~f7*f11  0.148293    0.048781    0.855134  
f6*f11*f19  0.476829    0.121951    0.849262  
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~f7*f11*f13  0.307317    0.032439    0.891720  
f11*f19*~f20  0.350976    0.000000    0.736815  
~f7*f11*f19  0.277805    0.000000    0.818247 
Solution coverage: 0.623171 
Solution consistency: 0.817077 
 
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---  
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  






f13*f11*~f7*f6*f4*~f1 0.123902    0.089512    0.831424  
f19*f15*f13*f11*f6*f1 0.364146    0.221220    0.870554  
f20*f19*f15*f13*f11*~f7*f4 0.069024    0.024390    1.000000  
f19*f15*f13*f11*~f7*f4*f1 0.175610    0.032683    0.857143 
Solution coverage: 0.510732 
Solution consistency: 0.872500 
E. INTERACTIONS OF INSURGENTS/COIN FORCE BEST PRACTICES  
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---  
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  






f11*f19*r1  0.195122    0.024390    1.000000  
f11*r1*~r3*~r11 0.195122    0.024390    1.000000  
f6*f11*f19*~r4 0.512195    0.317073    0.954545  
f11*f13*~r3*r4*~r11 0.073171    0.048780    1.000000  
f6*~r4*r11  0.097561    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*~f11*~f13*f19 0.024390    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*f13*r11*~r39 0.097561    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*f13*~r1*r11 0.097561    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*~f11*~r1*r4*~r11 0.024390    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*~f11*~r1*r4*~r5 0.024390    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*~f11*~r1*~r3*r4 0.024390    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*~f11*~f13*r4*~r11 0.024390    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*~f11*~f13*r4*~r5 0.024390    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*~f11*~f13*~r3*r4 0.024390    -0.000000   1.000000  
f6*~f11*f19*~r1*r4 0.024390    -0.000000   1.000000  
Solution coverage: 0.707317 
Solution consistency: 0.966667 
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APPENDIX D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Even though the results detailed in Chapter III answer the research questions 
using a large number and wide variety of cases, some readers may doubt the durability of 
the findings. Do the results remain the same if the QCA value assigned to each action 
varies slightly? What is the maximum percentage of random variation that the significant 
factors can withstand? To strengthen the argument, it was necessary to conduct a 
sensitivity analysis to determine the robustness of the principal findings. The literature on 
the QCA process talks very little about the procedures for testing the robustness of 
important findings. This is a critical step in traditional quantitative methods and some 
QCA experts argue that, “robustness tests, using systematic procedures, should be 
regarded as an important, and maybe even indispensable, analytical step in 
configurational [sic] comparative analysis.”63 
The sensitivity analysis used to test the robustness of the key findings centers 
around the fuzzy data used in the previous chapters. The fuzzy data is the only dataset 
used in this section because it allows for membership scores beyond the binary crisp 
scores. The same QCA steps were used to analyze 30 variations of this original data. The 
value of each significant factor used in the QCA analysis process was randomly varied 
using functions in the Excel dataset. The original score for each factor was randomly 
varied plus or minus 10 percent. Ten percent variation was used because anything less 
produced results that were very similar to the original findings and anything more 
produced results that were inconclusive.64 Using this technique, a factor with an original 
membership score of .50 could produce a new score anywhere between .40 and .60. This 
randomly produced both stronger and weaker scores for each factor within the 70 cases  
 
 
                                                 
63 Svend-Erik Skaaning, “Assessing the Robustness of Crisp-set and Fuzzy-set QCA Results,” 
Sociological Methods & Research 40, no. 2 (April 2011): 391. 
64 The analysis shows that the robustness results remain approximately the same up to a variation of 
plus or minus 15 percent of the original factor membership score. Above that percentage, the set of 
meaningful attributes becomes less dominate and the disparity between all 10 factors begins to decrease. 
See Figures 12 and 13.  
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studied. The 30 dataset variations were ran through the QCA software and each iteration 
produced a new set of causal recipes, which varied between one and 13 recipes in each 
set. 
The sensitivity analysis process produced results that reinforce the original 
findings. This suggests that these findings are, in fact, robust and they can withstand a 10 
percent variation. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the results. These two figures show the 
frequency each factor occurred in the causal recipe variations. Figure 10 accounts for 
only the most significant recipe from each iteration. That is, the recipe that produced the 
highest percentage of raw coverage. In this instance, the maximum possible frequency for 
any factor is 30 because that is the total number of repetitions. Figure 11, on the other 
hand, accounts for the two most significant recipes. Therefore, the maximum possible 
frequency for any factor is 60. 
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Figure 10.  Frequency in 30 Most Significant Recipes (10% Variation) 
Figure 10 shows that providing better governance than the government in the area 
of conflict (f11) and not engaging in more coercion or intimidation than the COIN force 
(~f7) remain the most influential action for an insurgent force. Factor 11 was present in 
90 percent of the recipes and a negated factor 7 was present in 80 percent of the recipes. 
This process also reinforces all of the remaining best and worst insurgent practices except 
demonstrating potency through impressive or spectacular attacks (f6). This suggests that 
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Figure 11.  Frequency in 60 Most Significant Recipes (10% Variation) 
Figure 11 shows similar results for the important factors with one key difference. 
Receiving external support from a strong state/military (f19), emerged as the second most 
influential action behind the factor 11 (providing better governance). This is important 
because it suggests that external military support is a sensitive factor and if the degree of 
support changes it could have an effect on the conflict outcome. However, this finding 
does not change the soundness of the original external support hypothesis (H5).  External 
support is not necessary and by no means is it sufficient. 
Lastly, it is essential to show how the results change as the variation percentage 
increases. At 25 percent variation in the original factor scores, the importance of each 
factor becomes much less evident. Figures 12 and 13 demonstrate that several factors 
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original conclusions of this thesis are robust to some degree. However, it also highlights 
the fact that each factor has a maximum variation threshold. Above this threshold, the 
QCA causal recipes suggest that almost all factors are important to an insurgent force.  
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APPENDIX E. DATASET QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Insurgents require a safe haven from which to operate.  
Hypothesis 2: The insurgent force cannot be perceived as worse than the COIN force in the area of conflict.  
Hypothesis 3: It is better for insurgents to provide or ensure basic services for the population than to focus 
on discrediting or delegitimizing the COIN force/government.  
Hypothesis 4: Longer conflict duration does not necessarily correlate with an insurgency win.  
Hypothesis 5: External support is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
Variable groupings and factors 
(H1) Insurgents established a reliable and secure safe haven  
f1.  Parts of the area of conflict were no-go or otherwise denied to the COIN force 
f2.  Military action outside of host-nation borders (if insurgents relied on cross-border support or havens) 
f3.  Terrain played a major role because it provided sanctuary for the insurgents (COIN forces could 
not/would not enter terrain) 
(H2) Insurgents effectively shaped the perception of the population  
f4.  Insurgents collateral damage not perceived by population in area of conflict as worse than COIN force 
f5.  Insurgents exploited deep-seated/intractable issues to gain legitimacy 
f6.  Insurgents demonstrated potency through impressive or spectacular attacks 
f7.  Insurgents engaged in more coercion/intimidation than COIN force 
f8.  Insurgents employed unconstrained violence (against civilians) to create and sustain insecurity and 
instability (purposely or otherwise) 
f9.  Insurgents delegitimized due to civilian casualties or other unacceptable behavior 
f10.  Insurgents forcibly recruited from civilian population 
(H3) Insurgents effectively displaced government structure and functions  
f11.  Insurgents provided better governance than government in area of conflict 
f12.  Insurgents provided or ensured provision of basic services in areas they controlled or claimed to 
control 
f13.  Insurgents discredited/delegitimized COIN force/government 
(H4) Insurgents effectively managed the duration of the conflict  
f14.  Insurgents mostly avoided engaging in large-scale operations against better-equipped regular troops 
and resorted primarily to guerrilla tactics (e.g., sniping, sabotage, small-scale ambushes/hit-and-run attacks, 
IEDs) 
f15.  Conflict caused significant host-nation economic disruption 
f16.  Fighting primarily force-on-force conventional engagement 
f17.  Insurgents switched from guerrilla to conventional tactics 
f18.  Insurgents switched from conventional to guerrilla tactics 
(H5) Insurgents enlisted help from an external participant  
f19.  Insurgents received external support from strong state/military 
f20.  External professional military engaged in fighting on behalf of insurgents 
f21.  External support continued to sustain conflict that otherwise would likely have ended 
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